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Abstract 
Citizens’ juries are the most common technique in the panoply of deliberative methods 
employed within mini-publics to offer direct forms of democratic engagement.  They 
provide opportunities for learning, reflection and deliberation on contentious public 
policy issues.  This paper presents evidence of how jurors’ opinions change in these 
different phases on the topic of on-shore wind farms arising from three citizens’ juries 
in Scotland (n=47), one with an established wind farm, one with a planned 
development, and one with no plans for one in the foreseeable future.  The jurors were 
invited to consider issues to do with national energy policy and climate change, energy 
generation, wind power and the specifics of wind farms, such as their environmental 
and social impact. 
Evidence was constructed through an extensive process involving mixed methods.  
This included a quantitative analysis of responses at four different time points; viz.  
before and after each of two days of meetings, separated by a two to three week 
interval, in each locality.  Complementary qualitative analysis was carried out on 
ethnographies, evaluation reports, and documentation produced during the workshop 
sessions.  This paper will provide a statistical panel analysis of the changes in jurors’ 
opinions regarding different aspects of wind farms in relation to the four time points to 
gauge to what extent substantive changes were associated with the learning, reflective 
and deliberative phases.  This will be supplemented by qualitative analysis to draw 
complementary understanding about the meanings of such attitudinal changes. 
  
Introduction 
Mini-publics are regarded as the best way to institutionalise the theory of deliberative 
democracy, of which citizens’ juries have been the most used form of citizen 
engagement (Elstub 2014).  They are viewed as providing a valuable opportunity for 
citizens to deliberate on important and contentious issues, with the potential to revise 
their preferences in light of deliberation.  This paper analyses three citizens’ juries 
conducted in different locations in Scotland on the contested topic of onshore wind 
farms.  Although part of a research project, the citizens’ juries were nonetheless 
designed to inform Scottish debate about both wind farms and public engagement 
processes.  The job of the jurors was to address the following question: ‘What should 
be the key principles for deciding about wind farm development, and why?’  
Accordingly, the citizens’ juries were invited to engage with long-term considerations 
regarding policy, energy generation and climate change.  Using findings from the 
mixed methods research, the paper analyses if, when and why jurors change their 
preferences during the course of the jury process. 
The paper is divided into five sections.  The first two consider the theories and empirical 
studies of preference change in relation to deliberative democracy and citizens’ juries, 
respectively.  The third section outlines the methodological aspects of the study, 
leading into the fourth section which presents the findings.  The fifth section discusses 
the results in relation to what is already known and makes a tentative set of 
conclusions. 
Deliberative democracy and preference change 
The normative claim which unites deliberative democracy is that political decision-
making should be ‘talk-centric’ rather than ‘vote-centric’ (Chambers 2003: 308).  
Rather than merely constituting the aggregation of individual preferences, collective 
decisions should emerge from reasoned discussion and debate.  A key reason for 
making this normative claim is that deliberative theorists conceive preferences as 
exogenous and therefore formed during the political process, rather than prior to it 
(Elstub 2008).  Such considerations have prompted Elster (1998: 6) to suggest that 
preference transformation is the defining mark of deliberative democracy: ‘The 
transformation of preferences through rational deliberation is the ostensible goal of 
arguing.’  During collective deliberation participants pool the relevant information they 
have on the issue at hand, leading to information gains for most participants.  This is 
certainly an important benefit of collective discussion; however, it is not just receiving 
more information that is thought to induce preference reflection and change amongst 
participants, but the process of public reasoning more broadly.  Democratic 
deliberation is publicly reasoned in the sense that people offer reasons in support of 
their opinions and perspectives and hope they will prove convincing to others.  They 
expect these reasons, and these reasons alone, to be the motivating force of other 
participants to reflect upon their existing preferences and form new preferences (Elstub 
2008).  Benhabib, therefore, argues that a decision-making procedure, based purely 
on aggregation, ‘proceeds from a methodological fiction’ as it assumes incorrectly that 
a pre-political citizen will have an ‘ordered set of coherent preferences’, when in fact 
democratic deliberation is required to produce this (Benhabib 1996: 71). 
Although when people vote they can privately deliberate and exercise judgement, this 
deliberation is usually private.  Thus, deliberative democrats argue that it does not 
open people up to the arguments of others, or force people to defend their choice to 
others: ‘The secret ballot allows the voter to express himself (sic), but not to be 
influenced by others or to have to account for his private choices in a public language’ 
(Barber 1984: 174).  Consequently, in private ballots ‘nothing stops the voter from 
voting on purely self-interested grounds, without any consideration for what would be 
a good decision for the collective’ (Fearon 1998: 53), meaning that the preferences of 
others may not be considered or respected (Brennan and Lomasky 1993: 217). 
However, preference change may not occur even after deliberation.  On reviewing the 
new information and considering the reasons of others provided in the course of the 
discussion, a participant may well decide that their initial preferences were still 
perfectly appropriate.  Therefore, in order for deliberation to occur, ‘reflection upon 
preferences in non-coercive fashion’ is required rather than preference change per se 
(Dryzek 2000: 2).  Furthermore, deliberation is not entirely dialogic, but primarily 
requires consideration which can also incur internally: ‘The whole point of deliberation, 
political or otherwise, is usually to make our decision processes more “reflective”’ 
(Goodin and Niemeyer 2003: 629).  Consequently, Goodin (2003:  63-64) suggests 
individual ‘deliberation within’ can also generate public reason because others can be 
made ‘imaginatively present’ through individuals conducting ‘a wide ranging debate 
within their heads.’ This involves an ‘internal reflective process’ amongst participants 
where they put themselves in the place of the other (Goodin 2000: 81).  Indeed, we 
weigh up reasons and attempt to understand the reasons of others, all through internal 
reflection (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003: 629).  The problem is that in large-scale 
societies such as the UK, mass debates, where all are conversationally present, are 
an impossibility.  This being the case, Goodin proposes that we rely more on facilitating 
‘deliberation within’ – on people’s ‘empathic imaginings’: ‘Deliberation, on this account, 
is less a matter of making people “conversationally present” and more a matter of 
making them “imaginatively present” in the minds of deliberators’ (Goodin 2000:.  83). 
 
Citizens’ juries and preference change 
Mini-publics are the most lauded device for institutionalising deliberative democracy, 
and citizens’ juries have been the most used type (Elstub 2014).  The rationale for 
mini-publics is based on the premise that deliberative democracy is so difficult to 
achieve in practice that it will not occur naturally, so the conditions for democracy need 
to be artificially created.  They are seen as an opportunity for citizens to deliberate on 
important and contentious issues, and to revise their preferences in light of 
deliberation.  For Goodin (2008: 11), mini-publics are democratic innovations that are 
made up of ordinary, non-partisan, lay citizens and are ‘designed to be groups small 
enough to be genuinely deliberative and representative enough to be genuinely 
democratic.’  Therefore their goal is to strike a balance between the competing choice 
of rule by deliberative elites or non-deliberative masses.  Either a random or stratified 
quota sample of the population is selected to achieve a ‘deliberative microcosm’ of the 
population, with each citizen ideally having an equal chance of being selected.  
Participants are remunerated, the discussions are facilitated and experts provide 
evidence and advocacy of relevant information and positions, who are then cross-
examined by the lay citizens (Fishkin and Luskin 2000).  They are usually issue specific 
and dissolved as soon as the issue has been deliberated (Dryzek 2010: 59).  Despite 
these common features, there are a variety of types of mini-public, including citizens’ 
juries, planning cells, consensus conferences, deliberative polls and citizen 
assemblies. 
The mini-publics most commonly employed in the UK are citizens’ juries (Davidson 
and Elstub 2014).  Citizens’ juries were first established in 1971 in the USA by Ned 
Crosby of the Jefferson Centre, but have been employed in many other countries since 
then, including the UK, Netherlands, Ireland, France and Australia (Crosby and 
Nethercut 2005).  Approximately, 12-25 (stratified) randomly selected participants are 
assembled for 4-5 days to discuss an issue and produce a collective recommendation 
(Davidson and Elstub 2014).  Given the small number of participants, Citizens’ juries 
are not intended to be statistically representative of the population, as with larger mini-
publics like deliberative polls, but rather to be ‘demographically diverse’ (Hendriks 
2005: 96).  According to its originators, citizens’ juries are designed to provide jurors 
with some control over the process, including facilitation, choice of witnesses, and the 
nature of interaction with the witnesses (Crosby and Nethercut 2005: 114). 
There has been relatively widespread use of citizens’ juries in the UK, with hundreds 
being set up to deliberate on a vast array of issues (Delap 2001).  The British Prime 
Minister, Gordon Brown, lauded them as a means of reinvigorating local democracy.  
For him, citizens’ juries ‘are not a substitute for representative democracy but an 
enrichment of it’ (Brown 2007).  Local government, government agencies and health 
authorities have been particularly active in utilising this form of deliberative 
mechanism, with many being run by the King’s Fund, the Institute for Public Policy 
Research and the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (Smith 2009: 108).  As a 
consequence, numerous health issues have been covered by citizens’ juries in the UK, 
such as services for the dying, health care rationing and the funding and future of the 
NHS more generally.  However, they have also been employed to offer policy input on 
many environmentally relevant issues, for example waste management, GM food and 
crops, and nanotechnology (Davidson and Elstub 2014). 
Preference change seems commonplace in citizens’ juries; for example, in a number 
of citizens’ juries in the UK the jurors nearly all changed their preferences (Coote and 
Lenaghan 1997; McIver 1997; Stewart et al. 1994; Parkinson 2006: 98; Smith 2009: 
95; French and Laver 2009).  However, these studies are based on before and after 
surveys of the jurors.  They show that preferences do change, but cannot fully explain 
when and why the preferences changed.  The evidence on preference change, from 
mini-publics in general and citizens’ juries in particular, has consequently been 
criticised, as it is hard to prove that preference change has been the result of 
deliberation and not just the distributed information packs, the media coverage, or 
other political or psychological factors (Shapiro 2003; Jordan 2007; Sanders 2010). 
Research (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003) on an Australian citizens’ jury, ‘The Far North 
Queensland Citizens’ Jury’, has sought to resolve this shortcoming of citizens’ jury 
research.  In this study the jurors were surveyed at the beginning and after the jury 
process, but also during the process after the information phase when witnesses 
provided their testimonies, but before the deliberation phase of the jury.  This is 
important as it helps ascertain if, when and why the preferences of the jurors changed.  
It is important to note that this first ‘information’ phase is discursive too as it includes 
questioning of the witnesses and informal talk, but it can still be differentiated from the 
more formal deliberation phase where the jurors strive to reach a collective viewpoint 
on the issue at hand (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003: 633).  The before and after analysis 
indicated that the jurors’ preferences on the various policy options ‘shifted dramatically 
from the beginning to the end of the process’ (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003: 632).  
However, analysis of all three questionnaires suggests that ‘the bigger change, by a 
wide margin, occurred in the minds of the jurors before the jury’s formal discussion 
began’ (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003: 634).  Although the deliberation phase did 
produce preference change too, the differences between the information and 
deliberative phases on preference change were statistically significant (Goodin and 
Niemeyer 2003: 634).  The jurors themselves also considered the information phase 
to have had the greatest impact on their preference changes during the citizens’ jury 
process (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003: 635). 
This result is supported by evidence from other mini-publics in the UK such as 
deliberative polls (Luskin et al.  2002: 474-8) and also citizens’ assemblies in Canada 
(Fournier et al.  2011), where again information, rather than discussion, had the 
greatest influence on preference changes.  More recently, research from another mini-
public in Ireland in 2011 indicated that a control group, provided with the same 
information packs as the mini-public participants who deliberated, did not undergo as 
much preference change, indicating that deliberation might still be crucial (Farrell et al.  
2012).  Clearly, further research is required to establish the cause of citizen preference 
change in mini-publics and the extent that deliberation is a causal factor. 
With respect to the Australian citizens’ jury, Goodin and Niemeyer (2003) do not 
conclude that the preference change can simply be explained by information gains.  
After all, discussion did occur during the information phase and the deliberative phase 
also led to preference change.  Rather, they conclude, that the data indicates that 
internal-reflexive processes of ‘democratic deliberation within’ are of central 
importance to the deliberative process: ‘The initial processes of focusing attention on 
a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely 
to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the 
information people have about the issue but also the way people process that 
information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue’ (Goodin and 
Niemeyer 2003: 642).  Furthermore, when receiving the information in the initial phase, 
the jurors did so in anticipation of having to deliberate later in the process, where they 
knew they would have to defend their views with reasons (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003: 
643). 
A further issue on preference change in mini-publics, which relates to when and why 
people change their preferences, is whether similar results and outcomes will emerge 
from mini-publics addressing the same issues.  As mini-publics rely on a sample of 
citizens, a problem arises as to whether a different sample of citizens, with different 
experts and different briefing materials, would have very different preferences post 
deliberation (Sturgis et al.  2005: 33).  Citizens’ juries are potentially more affected by 
this issue than other types of mini-public, since they do not comprise scientifically 
comparable samples (Fishkin 2009).  However, the Australian citizens’ jury in 
Queensland, was a one off, isolated citizens’ jury, with no others held on the same 
issue.  Therefore, we do not know if another sample of citizens would have adopted 
similar preferences after the process. 
In contrast there was a series of eight Deliberative Polls (DPs) held in Texas where 
electric utility companies were required to engage in public consultation.  In these DPs 
82% of the information items in the questionnaire showed statistically significant 
changes.  Across the eight Polls the mean information gain averaged 22%, ranging 
from 13% to 37% (Luskin et al.  1999).  In addition, similar preference changes 
occurred in each poll despite the different citizens included in each, as each group 
polled ended up with preference shifts from pre to post deliberation in the same 
direction (Fishkin 2006).  For example, post deliberation a majority of citizens were 
willing to pay more for renewable energy, invest in conservation programmes and 
subsidise lower income energy users (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004: 55).  They opted 
for a combination of natural gas, renewable energy, and conservation.  Those willing 
to pay more for conservation went from 52% beforehand to 84% afterwards across all 
8 DPs (Fishkin 2009: 124).  Those who agreed to pay more for their utility bills –to have 
increased provision from wind power and to have greater conservation efforts– rose 
by 30% when averaged across the eight DPs (Fishkin 2009: 142).  These preference 
changes were consistent across all social groups (Luskin et al. 1999).  However, with 
respect to the causes of these preference changes, there are no data available from 
the Texas DPs.  Participants were surveyed at the beginning of the poll and at the end, 
so it is impossible to deduce whether information gains or deliberation had the greatest 
impact on the participants’ preferences.  Results from a different DP in the UK indicate 
that it is information, rather than discussion that had the greatest influence on 
preferences (Luskin, et al. 2002: 474-8). 
 
  
Methodology 
Here we outline the research project that was developed to investigate the dual 
interests in, firstly, the substantive understanding of public attitudes to environmental 
issues, specifically on-shore windfarm development, and secondly, the methodological 
understanding of what might be learnt from deliberative mini-publics.  This paper 
focusses on aspects of the latter aim.  The project ran from April 2013 to January 2015, 
sponsored by the Edinburgh Centre for Carbon Innovation1 and ClimateXChange2. 
Sample 
Three citizens’ juries were held in different locations in Scotland (Table 1 and Figure 
1), which were selected according to their exposure to wind farm developments: one 
location where there is a wind farm, one where a wind farm has been proposed and 
another where there are no existing or proposed wind farms nearby.  Each jury 
comprised between 15 and 18 participants, selected to represent a cross-section of 
Scottish citizens.  The jury was held over two Saturdays, two to three weeks apart, and 
jurors were compensated for their participation (£70 for day 1 and £100 for day 2). 
Table 1. Three Scottish citizens' juries on wind farms 
Jury 
number 
Dates Location Main town 
population 
Wind farms Local 
Authority 
Area / 
population 
1 26th October 
and 16th 
November 
2013 
Coldstream 1,813 No existing or 
proposed 
wind farms 
Scottish 
Borders / 
109,270 
2 9th and 23rd of 
November 
2013 
Helensburgh 14,626 Wind farm 
has been 
proposed 
Argyll & 
Bute / 
91,190 
3 18th January 
and 1st of 
February 
2014 
Aberfeldy 1,895 Existing wind 
farm 
Perth & 
Kinross / 
137,520 
 
1 http://www.edinburghcentre.org  
2 http://www.climatexchange.org.uk  
                                               
Figure 1. Jury locations: Coldstream (Scottish Borders), Helensburgh (Argyll 
and Bute), and Aberfeldy (Perth and Kinross) 
 
Source: http://www.scottish-places.info/scotland.html  
Participants were recruited by the research company Ipsos MORI using a face-to-face 
approach conducted door-to-door and in-street.  This entails sending trained recruiters 
to the area where the jury will be held, to enlist jurors according to a pre-agreed 
specification.  The main advantages of this approach, according to Ipsos Mori 
(Recruitment report), are that:  
x The recruitment is undertaken in the immediate run up to the jury so drop outs 
are less likely; 
x It usually ensures a good rate of participation, as people are less likely to refuse 
to take part in a jury when approached by a recruiter in person; 
x Attendance rates tend to be higher because of the face-to-face commitment 
jurors have made; 
x The jurors tend to be more representative of the population because they are 
less self-selecting than those recruited through the electoral roll. 
 
 
Table 2. Participant recruitment (aggregate of the 3 citizens’ juries) 
 Target (%) Actual (%) 
 Gender   
 Male  
 Equal split  44% 
 55% 
 Female 
 Age   
 18-24 
 20%  20% 
 25-54 
 50%  53% 
 55+ 
 30%  26% 
 Working status   
 Full time 
 Mix 
 32% 
 8% 
 16% 
    Part time 
    Not working 
 Income   
 under £15,600 per year 
 40%  28% 
 £15,600 to £31,199 
 20%  32% 
 £31,200 to £51,999 
 10%  16% 
 £52,000 or above 
 5%  8% 
 Civic activities   
 Have taken part in one or more activities 
 Mix 
 50% 
 Haven’t taken part  50% 
 Attitudes towards wind farms in Scotland   
 Should be more  
 Mix 
 45% 
 Should be fewer  24% 
 Current level about right  31% 
 Attitudes towards the environment   
 Very interested 
 Mix 
 76% 
    Fairly interested 
 Not very interested 
 24% 
    Not at all interested 
 
Citizens were selected to broadly represent the Scottish demographic profile of 
gender, age and income (see Table 2).  A hidden question in the recruitment process 
allowed the selection of participants with a range of interest in wind energy, without 
revealing at this stage that the discussions were going to focus on on-shore windfarms.  
The group also represented a mixture of working status, involvement in civic activities, 
such as volunteering or activist work, and a range of attitudes towards the 
environment.  The jury topic remained unknown to the participants prior to the event 
to minimize the self-selection of an already-engaged minority, so the project was 
vaguely described to prospective participants as ‘public conversations about 
environmental issues’.  Recruiters were instructed to inform participants that they didn’t 
need to have any knowledge or interest in the topic.  The decision to introduce the 
event in this way was to give a broad sense of what the events may be about 
(otherwise people may be more reticent to sign up), without disclosing that they were 
about wind farm development. Each jury was held over two full days, either 2 or 3 
weeks apart (Figure 2). The process was designed and facilitated by two engagement 
practitioners whose approach is outlined in Escobar (2011) and Faulkner (2011).  At 
the start participants were presented with the overall task for the citizens’ jury: “There 
are strong views on wind farms in Scotland, with some people being strongly opposed, 
others being strongly in favour and a range of opinions in between. What should be 
the key principles for deciding about wind farm development in Scotland, and why?". 
Content 
On the first day, after an introduction and some preparatory work for the process, there 
were three witness sessions, where the jury heard brief presentations from one or two 
witnesses from universities, NGOs or trade bodies, who varied between citizens’ juries. 
This was followed by a longer session for scrutiny, where the jurors first worked in 
groups to prioritise key questions, and then interrogated the witnesses in plenary. The 
three sessions were: 
(i) Energy and Climate Change: The jury heard from one witness, an academic 
who sought to present an impartial overview. 
(ii) Wind Energy: Two witnesses, one presenting the argument ‘for’ and the other 
the argument ‘against’ wind power.  
(iii) Wind Farms: Two witnesses (different from those in session two), one 
presenting the argument ‘for’ and the other the argument ‘against’ onshore 
wind farms.  
Figure 2. Overall structure 
 
In case the jurors wished to learn more between the two days, each participant was 
provided with a user friendly Handbook3, which presented background information 
about climate change and energy, and links to many resources for further information 
in a range of formats.  After Day 1 the witnesses were given list of questions that were 
not addressed in the plenary, due to time constraints, and that were not answered in 
the Handbook.  Their written answers were circulated to the jurors approximately a 
week before Day 2. 
On the second day the jurors set the agenda by agreeing key themes to structure the 
day and worked through a series of deliberative sessions, which eventually led to the 
group ‘verdict’ on the task; i.e. a series of prioritised statements that expressed their 
principles for wind farm development and summed up the various opinions in the 
group. 
Data construction 
The project entailed a parallel mixed methods research design (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2009) comprising six data sources: 
x observation field notes by one ethnographer and one evaluator per jury;  
x questionnaires at four time points; 
x organisers and facilitators’ reflective notes; 
x audio recordings of all the sessions; 
3 The Handbook was prepared by staff at ClimateXChange, with suggestions and oversight by the Stewarding Board. 
Day 1
Learning phase:
Introduction to the 
process + witness 
sessions
Reflective phase:
Jurors receive 
information packs and 
responses to 
outstanding questions 
from Day 1
Day 2
Deliberative phase:
Jurors set the agenda 
and work together on 
the task
                                               
x transcriptions of the materials produced by the juries; e.g. the principles 
statements; questions to cross-examine the witnesses; etc. 
x interviews with witnesses and members of the Stewarding Board following the 
juries. 
This paper focusses on some results from the questionnaires and qualitative data to 
understand if, when and why citizens’ preferences changed during the jury process.  
At the start and end of each jury day participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire. Several questions were repeated throughout the process, allowing 
panel analysis of the information (Table 3).  This enables us to ascertain, for instance, 
the extent of participants’ knowledge gains and preference changes, helping us to 
understand if information gains or deliberation seem more influential.  The abbreviation 
QA is used to denote a questionnaire, alongside the number that indicates whether the 
QA was administered at the start (QA1) or end (QA2) of Day 1, or at the start (QA3) or 
end (QA4) of Day 2. 
Table 3. Questionnaires 
 
 
 
 
 
QA1, which serves to provide the baseline opinion and beliefs of the participants was 
administered at the start of day one.  QA2 was administered at the end of day one and 
covers what we refer to here as the learning phase, where information was presented 
to the participants.  QA3 was administered to the participants at the start of day two, 
which occurred two or three weeks after the first meeting, and captures what we refer 
to as the reflective phase, where participants had time to reflect on what they had learnt 
in Day 1.  QA4 was administered at the end of Day 2 and captures the deliberation 
phase of the juries, where the participants worked in groups and deliberated on the 
topic at hand to reach a group conclusion. 
 
  
Day Questionnaire No. of Sections 
No. of 
Questions 
1 
QA1 8 40 
QA2 6 32 
2 
QA3 6 23 
QA4 9 39 
Data analysis 
The questionnaires were highly structured with mainly closed response options, which 
led to numerical coding of the answers in a variety of levels of measurement.  These 
data were analysed using Stata statistical software to explore, describe and model the 
relationships between the multiple variables derived from the questions. 
The quantitative analyses that follow are based on three scaled variables that were 
created to reflect citizens underlying opinions on three topics: wind power and energy 
policy, wind farms in the locality, and wind farm planning.  Each scale is an additive 
index based on the strength of disagreement/agreement with a series of statements4 
related to the topics listed above (Table 4).5 
Although three locations were used to implement the citizen juries, we consider the 
three groups as one sample and analyse the data as such.  In order to look for where 
citizens opinions changed and/or changed the most during the citizen jury process we 
examine and test for change in mean opinion scores across the three scales between 
each phase of the juries: learning, reflection, and deliberation. 
To begin with, dependent sample t tests were used to compare the aggregate change 
between each questionnaire.  The specific modelling of the four time phases of the 
questionnaires used panel analysis to link the anonymised individuals’ opinion 
changes at each stage.  This employed both unconditional change score models 
(assuming no impact of response at one time point on change over time) and three-
wave random effects GLS regression modelling (comparing changes between pairs of 
questionnaires) (Berrington et al, 2006; Finkel, 1995). 
The qualitative data was coded and analysed using NVivo to explore the meanings 
conveyed in both the participants’ reflections on the process and the observations of 
the researchers and the members of the Stewarding Board.  Inter-rater reliability 
involving five coders was tested on a selection of the materials. 
 
 
  
4
 Scores on each question ranged from 1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree. 
5
 Each participant has a scaled score equal to the sum of all his/her responses to a set of questions in each questionnaire.  In 
situations where a participant did not answer a particular question, the missing value is replaced with the median response to the 
given question for the participant’s location, in that wave. 
                                               
Table 4: Questions used to Create Additive Scales6 
Scale: Wind Power and Energy Policy 
Coding 
Reversed 
It is important for Scotland to develop its wind energy resources  
I think Scotland should invest in other renewable electricity sources rather X 
     than wind power  
Wind energy development is important for combatting climate change  
Wind energy development is economically important for Scotland  
For wind energy, the positives outweigh the negatives  
Wind farm developments offer the prospect of future jobs in Scotland 
 
 
Scale: Wind Farms in the Locality   
I would like it if this area produced electricity from wind power  
I would like it if this area produced electricity from wind power, if the  
     electricity was for local use  
I would prefer to see electricity from wind power produced somewhere other X 
     than this area  
Wind farm developments decrease the value (the price) of houses nearby X 
The financial rewards from wind farms benefit the energy companies rather X 
     than the local community   
Overall, communities located close to wind farms benefit from the 
     development 
 
Wind farms would not change my relationship with the countryside 
 
 
Scale: Wind Farm Planning   
I support the development of onshore wind farms in appropriate locations  
I support the development of wind farms offshore (at sea)  
Wind farms pose greater threat to the local environment than climate change X 
Wind farms are planned and designed to minimise the potential  
     environmental damage  
Wind farms are planned and designed to minimise the potential disruption  
      to people living nearby  
The rules about wind farm plans minimise the noise and visual appearance  
     of wind farms  
Wind farms are harmful to the health of people living nearby X 
 
6
 The Cronbach’s  alpha for the scales based on the listed questions are as follows: Wind power and energy policy 0.9246, wind 
farms in the locality 0.8047, and wind farm planning 0.8783 
                                               
Results 
We present here the findings of the quantitative analyses, while the qualitative 
interpretations will be discussed in relation to these findings in the next section. The 
analyses are based on responses from a total of 47 jurors,7 in three locations: 
Coldstream (15 participants), Helensburgh (14 participants), and Aberfeldy (18 
participants).   
Table 5 shows the results for the first attitudinal index, ‘Wind Power and Energy Policy’. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for ‘Wind power and energy policy’ index 
Questionnaire n mean standard 
deviation 
min max net 
change 
aggregate 
change 
QA1 47 20.62 5.89 6 29   
QA2 47 17.53 6.46 6 27 -3.09 -3.09 
QA3 47 17.51 6.81 6 29 -0.02 -3.11 
QA4 47 16.70 7.02 6 28 -0.81 -3.92 
 
At the beginning of day one, we see in the aggregate results that individuals carried a 
rather more positive opinion on wind policy (average score of over 20 points, higher 
than the 18 for all neutral answers).  Over the course of the survey we see a decline 
in opinion on wind policy dropping in each successive wave.  The largest drop by far 
of 3.09 points (p=0.018) occurs in the learning phase between QA1 and QA2, while 
between QA2 and QA3 the drop is 0.02 (a hardly noticeable shift), and between QA3 
and QA4 the drop is about 0.8 (still quite marginal), giving an overall drop of 3.91 
between QA1 and QA4. 
The aggregate results for the ‘Wind farms in the Locality’ index are presented in Table 
6. 
7
 At the start of the surveys there were 49 participants but two dropped out of the process. 
                                               
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for ‘Wind farms in the locality’ index 
Questionnaire n mean standard 
deviation 
min max net 
change 
aggregate 
change 
QA1 47 20.43 5.11 7 28   
QA2 47 17.70 5.77 7 26 -2.73 -2.73 
QA3 47 18.19 6.14 7 29 +0.49 -2.24 
QA4 47 17.49 6.01 7 25 -0.70 -2.94 
 
Prior to the beginning of the learning phase, aggregate opinions were relatively 
moderate with the average score just below the mean of 21.  The largest drop occurs 
between QA1 and QA2 of 2.73 (p=0.017), a rise of 0.49 between QA2 and QA3, and 
a further drop of 0.70 between QA3 and QA4 (the latter two showing quite negligible 
changes).  There is an overall drop between QA1 and QA4 of 2.94 points.  Similar to 
the policy variable, the largest change occurs over the learning phase between QA1 
and 2. 
Thirdly, Table 7 shows the results for ‘Wind Farm Planning’ index. 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for ‘Wind farm planning’ index 
Questionnaire n mean standard 
deviation 
min max net 
change 
aggregate 
change 
QA1 47 24.85 6.26 7 35   
QA2 47 22.62 6.51 7 35 -2.23 -2.23 
QA3 47 22.40 6.84 9 35 -0.22 -2.45 
QA4 47 21.91 7.12 7 35 -0.49 -2.94 
Table 8: Socio-demographic variables over 4 waves 
Age n % 
18 – 24 36 19.15 
25 – 34 32 17.02 
35 – 44 28 14.89 
45 – 54 40 21.28 
55 – 64 20 10.64 
65 – 74 24 12.77 
75+ 8 4.26 
Total 188 100.00 
Gender   
Male 84 46.67 
Female 96 53.33 
Total 180 100.00 
Education8   
School 20 13.51 
Further education 40 27.03 
Higher education 88 59.46 
Total 148 100.00 
 
Prior to the citizens’ jury process average opinion in the aggregate was above the 
mean of 21, suggesting a more positive view regarding wind farm planning.  Over the 
8 An additional Other category has been excluded. 
                                               
course of the four questionnaires the mean in the aggregate drops closer to a more 
neutral opinion.  The largest opinion change occurs between QA1 and QA2 with a drop 
of 2.23 points (p=0.093).  Between QA2 and QA3 opinion drops by about 0.2 points, 
with a further drop of about 0.5 points between QA3 and QA4.  Overall, there is an 
opinion shift of 2.94 (p=0.036) towards a more negative view. 
The random effects GLS regression, with panel corrected standard errors, is based on 
the dependent variable being the change between each wave for the participant on 
each variable; i.e. relative rather than absolute change.  The socio-demographic 
controls are shown in Table 8, with age and education treated as ordinal variables, 
and gender as a dichotomous variable.  The sample sizes reflect the number of jurors 
over four waves of the survey. 
The results from the random effects GLS model are shown in Table 9.  Overall, age, 
gender, and education levels had little part to play in explaining the overall changes in 
opinion.  There was some indication that men were more likely to become more 
negative during the process, particularly in relation to wind power and energy policy, 
with a very slightly more positive attitudinal change among the more educated, but 
these are unreliable results, given the small sample sizes.  What stands out from these 
results is the more negative change among residents of Helensburgh compared to 
Coldstream and Aberfeldy, while these latter locations were not particularly different to 
each other regarding the average change. It is also very clear that the learning phase 
shows the biggest change in the negative direction compared to the reflection and 
deliberation phases, with these latter two stages not showing much difference to each 
other in relation to their impact on attitudes. 
By comparing the learning phase to the combination of the latter two phases, through 
use of a dummy variable, and likewise including a dummy for Helensburgh compared 
to the combination of the other localities, we can see the impact of these two variables 
on the opinion change coefficients in Table 10.  The learning phase on average saw a 
change of roughly -2 compared to the reflection and deliberation phases, indicating 
increasingly negative opinions.  Helensburgh showed on average -2 points change 
compared to Coldstream and Aberfeldy as well, indicating that Helensburgh was 
associated with a more negative opinion change. 
 
 
Table 9: Coefficients for estimated parameters of 3 attitudinal scales (re Tab 4) 
  Policy Locality Planning 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
  (s.e.) p-value (s.e.) p-value (s.e.) p-value 
Age 0.025 0.835 -0.016 0.885 0.073 0.636 
 (0.118)  (0.110)  (0.154)  
Gender -0.987 0.024 -0.518 0.203 -0.271 0.636 
[ref=female] (0.438)  (0.407)  (0.571)  
Education 0.227 0.448 0.354 0.202 0.418 0.282 
 (0.298)  (0.278)  (0.389)  
Coldstream 3.058 0.000 2.828 0.000 1.593 0.059 
[ref=Helensburgh] (0.646)  (0.601)  (0.843)  
Aberfeldy 2.990 0.000 2.303 0.000 2.239 0.004 
[ref=Helensburgh] (0.590)  (0.549)  (0.770)  
Reflection 1.806 0.011 2.694 0.000 3.056 0.004 
[ref=learning] (0.712)  (0.724)  (1.047)  
Deliberation 1.722 0.036 1.472 0.042 1.833 0.040 
[ref=learning] (0.823)  (0.724)  (0.891)  
R2  0.2004  0.2211  0.1415 
n   108   108   108 
 
 
 
 Table 10: Coefficients for estimated dummy parameters of 3 attitudinal scales 
  Policy Locality Planning 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
  (s.e.) p-value (s.e.) p-value (s.e.) p-value 
Helensburgh -2.278 <0.001 -2.031 <0.001 -1.963 0.001 
 (0.506)  (0.466)  (0.581)  
Learning -2.670 <0.001 -2.617 <0.001 -1.883 0.029 
 (0.722)  (0.720)  (0.860)  
R2  0.1673  0.1644  0.0847 
n   141   141   141 
 
Discussion 
In common with several other studies of citizens’ juries (Goodin and Niemeyer 
(2003); Luskin et al (2002); Fournier et al (2011)), we have found that the most 
influential stage in changing preferences is in the learning phase, rather than the 
later stages of reflection and deliberation.  At first sight this would appear rather odd, 
given that deliberative theory argues that preference transformation is a result of 
collective discussion, argument and public reasoning, rather than simply more 
information (Elster, 1998).  However, Goodin (2000) and Goodin et al (2003) 
emphasise that it is not necessarily dialogue, per se, that causes change, but a 
process of internal reflection, possibly due to having to deliberate the issues later in 
the process. 
In RUGHUWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHIDFWRUVWKDWLQÀXHQFHWKHRSLQLRQVWKDWSHRSOHKROGDQG
how those opinions might change, we have considered such factors as the change in 
knowledge of the topics consequent on the stage in the jury process, proximity to 
wind farms (as measured by the diơerent jury locations), strength of initial opinion on 
the topic, and socio-demographic characteristics.  Our analytical models explored the 
eơects of a number of demographic variables (age, gender and education), but we 
¿nd very little statistical correlation with the opinion changes observed. 
Our qualitative data, drawn from evaluations, ethnographies and informal 
conversations with the jurors, provide a greater understanding of the learning phase 
to enable a number of potential explanatory causes to be considered.  To begin with, 
jurors were provided with evidence from different perspectives on the topic, thus the 
witness presentations were naturally biased to their particular viewpoints.  The 
quality of the ‘evidence’ provided and variation in the style of delivery of this 
information between the juries (such as effective communication skills and 
appropriately pitched information) meant that the characteristics of the witnesses and 
their forms of delivery were highly influential in creating a sense of the veracity of 
claims that were being made.  Additionally, rather than being presented with 
‘objective’ or explicitly contextualised knowledge, some of the witnesses exposed 
jurors to a number of complex and controversial ideas about energy policy and 
windfarm development, and the potential impacts of windfarms, in some cases 
relying on anecdotes with little or no reputable source.  Little information was 
provided to the jurors on planning, regulation and monitoring of windfarm 
developments, while much emphasis was given to its difficulties or failings with 
regards to the local environment and economic aspects.  Certain witnesses appealed 
to their impartiality (due to being associated with academic institutions, for example) 
in contrast to those representing what were seen as vested interests (trade 
associations).  This, combined with a use of highly emotional rhetoric, created a 
sense of passion and commitment to a cause, which inevitably had a big impact on 
jurors.  The ‘anti’ windfarm witnesses gave a greater number of written answers to 
the remaining questions from the plenary cross-examinations and tended to remain 
for the refreshment breaks, enabling further interaction with the jurors.  The jurors’ 
trust in information sourced from academics remained strong throughout the juries, 
whereas trust in industry decreased.  That said, many of the jurors were aware that 
‘opinions were not facts’ and that the arguments rested in the larger context of 
climate change, thus understanding the need to weigh up the evidence and 
perspectives provided by both sides. 
Most participants in each location began the citizens’ juries being on the positive side 
of the arguments in favour of current energy policy in Scotland and windfarm 
development, but it is likely that the exposure to the complexity of the arguments, 
which were sometimes presented as a political debate, led to a more considered and 
sceptical response.  For the overwhelming majority of jurors, this was the first time 
they had been exposed to a task involving collective working with fellow citizens with 
a common purpose.  While the explicit reason for their involvement was to require 
them to deliberate on a complex set of tasks to arrive at a consensus on a set of 
principles, the incentive in the learning phase was to listen, consider and weigh the 
evidence and values presented to them largely on an individual basis, but with 
informal conversations in the interstices of the formal business of the day; e.g. during 
tea/coffee breaks, over lunch, or in snatched asides to each other. 
In other words, learning as an activity is not a purely passive act, but is a response to 
various stimuli, both formal (information packs, witnesses) and informal (between 
jurors), that incorporates discursive and reflective processes.  While the deliberative 
phase makes public the thoughts and discussions of jurors, it may be erroneous to 
assume that the preceding private and informal phase is not also part of deliberation. 
Although jurors reflected that they felt that they learnt the most about the topic on 
Day 1, they also report that the discussions and conversations in facilitated groups 
and in conversations were useful for helping them to make up their mind.  Indeed, in 
the break between the juries they found conversations with their friends and 
colleagues more helpful than other formal information sources.  Ethnographers note 
how the quality of the discussions were, on the whole, to a very high standard; 
sharing information and perspectives, and working together to put issues in to 
context.  However, as we touch on below, the deliberative quality in Helensburgh 
was, to some extent, more limited due to the general consensus across the group. 
It is clear that location is also an important factor in the findings about preference 
change, with Helensburgh providing the starkest example of a negative switch in 
opinions.  Although jurors held similar views about renewable energy policy in all 
three jury groups, at the start of the process the opinion about wind energy, wind 
farms and climate change was on average least supportive in the Helensburgh 
group.  The Helensburgh jury was not as diverse as the other juries on several 
factors, such as gender, where women were under-represented.  Moreover, it turned 
out that several were either related to each other or had prior friendships with other 
members of the group.  A report by the recruitment company which investigated the 
source of these recruitment issues found that, on balance, the participants who did 
not attend the process were mostly those who expressed moderate support for wind 
energy in the hidden question in the recruitment questionnaire.  Thus, the jury had 
fewer advocates to express their perspectives during the group conversations, which 
meant that the dialogue was not so rich and diverse in the individual sessions and in 
fact, at the end of Day 2, VHYHUDOMXURUVUHÀHFWHGKRw ‘group discussions and 
agreements backed up my opinions’.  The one Helensburgh juror in favour of wind 
farms felt like ‘the only one’ throughout the process. 
It is difficult to know whether having a planned rather than actual windfarm in the 
Helensburgh area is a major factor, although we do know that the plan has been 
controversial, especially given the rejection of another windfarm development in the 
vicinity, which had been criticised for the amount of money spent and wasted on the 
project.  Actually, it appears that many of these jurors were unaware of the plan, 
which might have raised some concerns in itself.  Another factor which might have 
been important in the case of Helensburgh was the nearby location of a nuclear 
submarine base, a significant employer in the area.  Unlike the other two localities, 
several of these jurors had suggested that nuclear power was a high priority for 
energy production, a position also taken by one of the academic witnesses. 
Those jurors who lived in the other localities were either used to windfarms 
(Aberfeldy) or were likely to be aware of several moderate scale windfarms in their 
region (Borders), even if not in their patch (Coldstream).  However, we did not see 
opinions becoming more extreme through the jury process, as even in the 
Helensburgh jury opinions were moving about, with some participants becoming 
more supportive, while others became more opposed.  This illustrates that the 
participants were engaging with both sides of the argument, rather than simply 
assimilating more information to back up views that they already held.  It was telling, 
however, that through listening to conversations in the breaks, the Helensburgh 
jurors, unlike in the other localities, were more likely to talk about other topics than 
the focus of the tasks and to be less likely to question the sources of evidence being 
presented to them by the expert witnesses. 
The Helensburgh jury had a few dominant voices, while in Coldstream the facilitators 
as well as the jurors had to work hard to control a few dominant individuals.  In 
contrast, the researcher observing the conversations in Aberfeldy noted how “there 
were no extremely polarised positions or dominating voices... and I had to really look 
at the group as a whole to see what was going on. While there were one or two 
people who seemed to engage more vocally with the presentations and witnesses, 
they did so without completely dominating the group or preventing others from 
participating. It was hard to see exactly where most of the group stood on wind farms 
at this stage in proceedings – there were no clear reactions during the presentations 
themselves, most jurors taking in the information and occasionally making notes 
rather than making emphatic gestures or statements to demonstrate their 
standpoint.” 
 
Conclusion 
The strength of this study is in the range of mixed methods and resulting data for 
analysing preference change, coupled with a longitudinal understanding of the 
dynamics of the jury process.  Surveys conducted at four time points, before and 
after each jury day, combined with observations, informal conversations and 
evaluations, offer the chance to measure and theorise how preferences change 
within each phase and in aggregate. 
 
Our findings reveal the importance of the first day, which we have labelled the 
learning phase, in changing jurors’ opinions, rather than the theoretically expected 
deliberative phase, or even the intermediary reflective phase.  Through interrogating 
the quantitative results using the qualitative data we tentatively conclude that our 
labelling of the phases, whilst ostensibly reflecting their purposes, actually may 
misrepresent what is occurring in the process.  The novelty of a citizens’ jury for most 
participants, in which deliberation was the ostensible purpose, took people from an 
initial, relatively uninformed state of knowledge to one where they were not 
necessarily better educated about the issues, but became increasingly aware of the 
breadth and depth of the contested terrain about this complex issue of public policy. 
 
We conjecture that the learning phase in these juries, through making the issues 
appear to be much more complex than first appreciated and, therefore, offering less 
clear solutions, led to jurors retreating into supporting the status quo or at least not 
advocating windfarm development, rather than running the risk of proposing 
deleterious change.  Reasoning may in fact take place in private or informally during 
the learning phase, when these new challenges are made clear, rather than being 
delayed until the deliberation phase when issues related to the psychological aspects 
of advocating and defending positions in public, such as confidence or saving face, 
become problematic.  This might have been catalysed by the perceived requirement 
to become briefed prior to the deliberative phase. 
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